Both Bakhtin and Vygotsky, as we have seen, responded directly or indirectly to the challenge of Freud. Both attempted to account for their data without resorting to postulating an unconscious in the Freudian sense. By way of contrast, it is instructive here to recall Jacques Lacan—who, among others, has been a beneficiary of Bakhtin’s “semiotic reinterpretation” of Freud.17 Lacan’s case is intriguing, for he retains the unconscious while at the same time submitting Freudian psychoanalysis to rigorous criticism along the lines (...) of Bakhtin. By focusing attention on the dialogic word, he encourages a rereading of Freud in which the social element is crucial. As Lacan opens his essay “The Empty Word and the Full Word”:Whether it sees itself as an instrument of healing, of formation, or of exploration in depth, psychoanalysis has only a single intermediary: the patient’s Word….And every word calls for a reply.I shall show that there is no word without a reply, even if it meets no more than silence, provided that it has an auditor: this is the heart of its function in psychoanalysis.18The word is conceived as a tool not only in the external world but also of an autonomous internal world as well. And what emerges, it would seem, is a reinterpretation of the role of dialogue in the painful maturational process of the child. For Vygotsky, the child’s realization of his separateness from society is not a crisis; after all, his environment provides both the form and the content of his personality. From the start, dialogue reinforces the child’s grasp on reality, as evidenced by the predominantly social and extraverted nature of his earliest egocentric speech. For Lacan, on the contrary, dialogue seems to function as the alienating experience, the stade du miroir phase of a child’s development. The unconscious becomes the seat of all those problems that Bakhtin had externalized: the origin of personality, the possibilities of self-expression. The je-moi opposition in the mirror gives rise to that permanent for “a locus where there is constituted the je which speaks as well as he who has it speak.”19 And consequently, the Word takes on an entirely different coloration: it is no longer merely an ideological sign but a potent tool for repressing knowledge of that gap, the face in the mirror, the Other. Lacan’s celebrated inversion of Saussure’s algorithm, with the line between signifier and signified representing repression, created a powerful but ominous new role for language. The child is released from his alienating image only through discovering himself as Subject, which occurs with language; but this language will inevitably come to him from the Other. Thus speech is based on the idea of lack, and dialogue, on the idea of difference. 17. See Ivanov, “The Significance of M. M. Bakhtin’s Ideas,” p. 314.18. Jacques Lacan, “The Empty Word and the Full Word,” in Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, ed. and trans. Anthony Wilden , p. 9.19. Lacan, from “La Chose freudienne” , quoted in Wilden, “Lacan and the Discourse of the Other,” in Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, p. 266. Caryl Emerson, assistant professor of Russian literature at Cornell University, has translated The Dialogic Imagination, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics . She is currently at work, on a study of Boris Godunov in Russian cultural history. (shrink)

Pompey has been treacherously killed, his body decapitated and thrown into the surf. The faithful Cornelia cannot give her husband a proper funeral, but must be content to place on the pyre all that is left of his greatness. Commentators are not of much help in this place, most caught up in tralatician glossing and hence content to echo the scholiastic reference to Pompey's three triumphs. Thomas Farnaby thought of the funeral of Misenus in Aeneid 6; but one looks in (...) vain to Grotius , Oudendorp , Burman , Bentley , Weber , Francken , Heitland-Haskins , Housman , Bourgery-Ponchont , and Luck for the most important parallel, which is to Dido in Aeneid. I adduce the passages Heinze well described as examples of ‘das Idealbild eines heroischen Weibes’: tu secreta pyram tecto interiore sub auras erige, et arma uiri thalamo quae fixa reliquit impius exuuiasque omnis lectumque iugalem, quo perii, super imponas: 494–7) super exuuias ensemque relictum effigiemque toro locat haud ignata futuri. hie, postquam Iliacas uestis notumque cubile conspexit, paulum lacrimis et mente morata incubuitque toro dixitque nouissima uerba: ‘dulces exuuiae…’. (shrink)

These lines conclude the speech of Pompey to Cornelia when she met him on the shore of Lesbos after the disaster of Pharsalia. This speech Mr. Heitland in his excellent Introduction to Haskins' Lucan has stigmatised as ‘abominable’.1 So far as the bulk of the speech is concerned a plea may perhaps be urged in mitigation of this judgment. Cornelia has completely broken down at the sight of her unfortunate husband, and his first object should be to restore her (...) to herself. For this purpose, as all, not excluding Lucan, know, a tone of sharp chiding would be most effectual, and we learn from the sequel that it succeeded : ‘uocibus his correpta uiri uix aegra leuauit | membra solo’ . For the crude brutality of the statement in the last four words there is however no excuse. But happily it is not to be charged to Pompey or to Lucan, but to the editions. We should punctuate. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 37.1 (2004) 1-20 [Access article in PDF] Endoxa, Epistemological Optimism, and Aristotle's Rhetorical Project Ekaterina V. Haskins Communication Department Boston College Aristotle's crucial role in institutionalizing the art of rhetoric in the fourth century BCE is beyond dispute, but the significance of Aristotle's rhetorical project remains a point of lively controversy among philosophers and rhetoricians alike. There are many ways of reading and evaluating Aristotle's (...) Rhetoric that depend on the philosophical, theoretical, and pedagogical purposes of the scholar.1 Most philosophical and rhetorical exegeses of the Rhetoric, however, while focusing on the text's connections to Aristotle's corpus and to the rhetorical tradition before and after Aristotle, seem to lack a critical perspective on Aristotle's relationship with his cultural context. Yet, like other parts of Aristotle's encyclopedic intellectual endeavor, much of Rhetoric 's cultural content was provided by endoxa, "reputable or received opinions."Since G. E. L. Owen's essay "Tithenai ta phainomena" (1961) many scholars have accepted the claim that endoxa, rather than empirical observations, are the source of Aristotle's own philosophical principles. The "linguistic" turn within Aristotelian studies has drawn attention to the role of "facts" of language and ordinary experience within Aristotle's philosophical method. As a result, a view of Aristotle as a hard-core empiricist has given way to a picture of a humanist who is attuned to the nuances of his cultural milieu. Still, this new portrait fails to take into account that Aristotle's manner of selecting and categorizing his linguistic resources allows him to transform what we would consider cultural beliefs into natural, and hence, atemporal premises. This pattern can be explained by Aristotle's "epistemological optimism," in itself a blend of several cultural assumptions about perception in general and vision in particular, the function of language, and the cyclical nature of human history. Part of this essay's objective, then, will be an explanation of these components of Aristotle's epistemological optimism. By appreciating Aristotle's difference [End Page 1] on these issues from our modern assumptions, we will be in a better position to understand why Aristotle relies on endoxa on all three levels of philosophical discourse (theoretical science, moral philosophy, and productive arts of poetics and rhetoric). Aristotle remains consistent in his treatment of endoxa throughout; rhetoric, however, presents a major challenge to Aristotle's epistemological optimism and his conception of language. I shall argue that Aristotle recognized this challenge and that he answered it by isolating proofs and rhetorical genres from their linguistic medium (lexis ), and postulating linguistic transparency (sapheneia ) as a stylistic norm. I. Aristotle's openness to appearances (phainomena ) and opinions (endoxa ) was accorded prominence especially thanks to the work of G. E. L. Owen and Martha Nussbaum. Owen was first to defend a linguistic translation of Aristotle's phainomena as "ordinary beliefs" and "appearances" against the then-prevalent rendition "observed facts." In so doing he asserted the crucial impact of the philosopher's cultural context on the formation of speculative discourse. Owen (1961) nonetheless demanded that phainomena be understood as empirical observations in Aristotle' treatises on biology and meteorology (84-86), so as to preserve the methodological and epistemological distinctions between inquiries into the natural world, on the one hand, and the world inhabited by human agents, on the other. Nussbaum (1986) went much further than Owen in asserting the role of phainomena and endoxa in Aristotle's inquiry. Unlike Owen, Nussbaum sees no fundamental difference between "experiences" of a philosopher and linguistic expressions of cultural beliefs and interpretations—his discursive data—from which Aristotle constructs his philosophical accounts. Nussbaum's chief (and highly influential) claim is that Aristotle's method is marked by a deep concern for the experiential world of his fellow men and their language. Aristotle's philosophical insights into the human condition, on this reading, echo and amplify classical Greek tragedy, despite the austere diction of Aristotle's extant treatises.Owing to this openness to the world of ordinary beliefs, Aristotle seems to depart from the Eleatic and Platonic distrust of human... (shrink)

It is hard to get very far in discussing aesthetic or religious subjects without invoking some version of the thought that ordinary consciousness is but the tip.

Addresses recent perspectives central to the interpretation and criticism of Dewey’s philosophy.

The term dunamis, by which Aristotle defines rhetoric in the first chapter of The Art of Rhetoric, is a "power" term, as its various meanings in Aristotle's corpus—from vernacular ones like "political influence" to strictly philosophical ones like "potentiality"—attest.1 In the Rhetoric, however, dunamis is usually translated as "ability" or "faculty," a designation that, compared to other terms that describe persuasion in ancient Greek poetics and rhetoric (such as "bia" ["force"] or "eros" ["seduction"]), marks rhetoric as a neutral human capacity (...) rather than the use of language entangled in the vagaries of violence and desire.2 John Kirby calls Aristotle's definition "one of the boldest moves in the history of .. (shrink)

Danto was not a fan of Dewey, the pragmatist who dominated Columbia's philosophy department for much of the twentieth century. A broad context for what might at first seem their total clash of philosophical temperaments is Danto's embrace of analytic philosophy in a period when classical pragmatism was evolving into the neopragmatism of Richard Rorty. A more specific context is Danto's preference for Cartesian‐inflected forms of atomistic explanation and representationalism, in contrast to Dewey's anti‐dualist and anti‐representationalist holism. In addition, Dewey's (...) vision of art as embodied in human experiences across the modern institutional spectrum contrasts starkly with Danto's more “compartmental” account of the Artworld. Yet despite these differences, both philosophers were also (in Dewey's case since the turn of the twentieth century, in Danto's case in late career) deeply, if differently, indebted to Hegel, who provided a fertile framework for understanding how human beings can at one and the same time be social, self‐interpreting spiritual beings and also natural beings. This fact provides a basis for thinking that while Danto never renounced his lifelong aversion to pragmatism, a subtler strand of Dewey's pervasive influence is present in his later writings. (shrink)

Writers in pragmatist aesthetics tend, as naturalists, to avoid the originally Kantian-Idealist term “autonomy” when discussing art and aesthetic experience. Even so, a more general autonomy concept, emphasizing that art and the aesthetic comprise a normatively special aspect of experience, is already implicit in much of the pragmatist aesthetics literature, including in John Dewey’s seminal Art as Experience. As the cultural disciplines move beyond earlier modernist- and postmodernist-era debates about art’s total autonomy from or total “heteronomous” absorption within the processes (...) of life, I argue that a more naturalistically down-to-earth version of the above general autonomy idea remains indispensable in a century of social, environmental, and existential crises whose solutions demand creative agency of a kind that artistically charged experiences can inspire. Drawing upon key pragmatist themes, I further develop the general autonomy idea by arguing that aesthetic experiences within and without the fine arts are horizontally transcendent; that art and the aesthetic answer a persistent human need for experiences that are intrinsically rewarding while also serving the instrumental function of being redemptive; that to this end, our global culture needs collectively accessible autonomous spaces within language and experience that can help people explore and interrogate the meanings of what we individually and collectively do; and that the value of our theoretical beliefs about the arts lies not in their power to represent a world supposedly independent of human thought and action but in what they lead us to do in the world. In conclusion, I illustrate this pragmatic interpretation of the general autonomy idea with a reading of Richard Powers’ novel The Overstory. (shrink)

AimsIn this pilot mixed-methods study, we examined the participants experiences of engaging in virtual drawing tasks and the impact of an olfactory stimulus on outcomes of affect, stress, self-efficacy, anxiety, creative agency, and well-being.MethodsThis study used a parallel mixed-methods, simple block randomization design. The study participants included 24 healthy adults aged 18 to 54 years, including 18 women and six men. The participants completed two 1-h immersive virtual art making sessions and were randomly assigned to receive either a fragrance or (...) a non-fragrance condition for the first session. Quantitative and qualitative datasets were collected concurrently and integrated during data analysis.ResultsThe quantitative results indicated that the fragrance condition demonstrated a significant reduction in negative affect, namely, reduced feelings of negativity when compared to the non-fragrance condition. A trend toward improvement in self-efficacy was also seen in the fragrance condition. No significant changes were found for fragrance or non-fragrance conditions for positive affect, anxiety, and creative agency. The qualitative findings included five themes related to art making experiences in virtual reality in both conditions: fun and joy; novelty of virtual media, experimentation, and play; relaxation and calm; learning curve; and physical discomfort and disorientation. Four themes were identified for virtual art content and visual qualities: nature imagery, references to memories and personal symbols, fantasy and play within imagery, and depiction of everyday objects.ConclusionsOverall, the participants reported positive responses to the novel virtual art making experiences which were further heightened by the inclusion of the fragrance stimulus for negative affect. These preliminary findings need to be replicated with larger sample sizes to confirm the outcomes and the trends that were seen in this pilot study. Further research is recommended to examine the differences between experiences of virtual and traditional art media and to examine different olfactory stimuli promoting focus and concentration. (shrink)

In recent years, scholars have paid considerable attention to moderation in Montesquieu’s De l’esprit des lois. Still, little scholarship has considered how Montesquieu develops moderation as a concept and practice. In this article, I argue Montesquieu’s complementary defense of moderation and critique of despotism rely on immoderate argumentative practices of omission that enable him to reshape extant laudatory narratives of China and Japan. Through an analysis of Montesquieu’s primary texts on climate and commerce, I demonstrate that, absent these practices, Montesquieu’s (...) “Asian despotism” collapses, revealing the moderate natures of both countries. This conclusion is paradoxical insofar as we take seriously Montesquieu’s claim that De l’esprit des lois upholds the spirit of moderation as of paramount importance. Moreover, I argue that this analysis of Montesquieu’s paradoxical spirit brings to light under-examined dimensions of Montesquieu’s work and alerts political theorists to how different reading practices can recast his “moderate” reputation. (shrink)

Dewey's "Art as Experience" defends the view that art and life are a y. But his version of this view exhibits an ambiguity, arising from his ency to move back and forth in the text between two usages of "art". These usages allow for two different interpretations of the theme of the unity and life: an "aesthetic" interpretation emphasizing the uniqueness of the arts as instrumentally valuable sources of aesthetic and ummatoryexperience, and an "aestheticist" interpretation emphasizing the ence of such (...) experience not only in the fine arts but throughout the trum of intelligent practice. Are these interpretations necessarily in ion, or can we read them as part of a single consistent argument about the re of art in Dewey's text? I arguethat we can, but to do so we need to dialectically, and with a glance toward a figure whose influence on Dewey nderappreciated in the recent literature: Hegel. (shrink)

The Coming Home Project of the Snowflower Sangha in Madison, Wisconsin is an active member of MOSES, a nonpartisan interfaith organization that works to promote systemic change for social justice issues with a focus on mass incarceration and ending the use of solitary confinement in the state's prisons and jails. To support these efforts, and to restore dignity and safety to the entire community, CHP members work to make Wisconsin's sentencing rules and laws more just and humane, increase treatment alternatives (...) to incarceration, stop crimeless revocations back to prison, and remove barriers to employment for previously incarcerated individuals returning to their communities. (shrink)

The concept of “gradually adaptive frameworks” is introduced as a model with the potential to describe the evolution of belief evaluative systems through the consideration of reasonable arguments and evidence. This concept is demonstrated through an analysis of specific points of disagreement between David Elliott’s praxial philosophy and Bennett Reimer’s aesthetic philosophy. A parallel case of disagreement is introduced from the literature of contemporary epistemology. This case, comprised of a disagreement between Thomas Kelly and Richard Feldman, deals explicitly with the (...) subject of “peer disagreement”. The discussion of this conceptual analysis is used to establish an advocacy position for the central positioning of critical thinking skills in any educative endeavor. (shrink)